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SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
During the past Term, the Supreme Court de-
cided two cases involving the right to a jury trial
in state criminal proceedings. In Burch v. Louisiana,
the Court held that a conviction by a nonunani-
mous six-person jury in a state criminal trial vio-
lated the right of the defendant to trial by a jury
of his peers guaranteed by the sixth 2 and four-
teenth 3 amendments. In Duren v. Missouri,4 the
Court held that the state interest in exempting all
women from jury duty is insufficient to overcome
a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community.
Both Burch and Duren demonstrate how the
Court is facing the challenge of changes it has
permitted or required in the makeup of the consti-
tutional jury which, under the common law, re-
quired twelve persons, unanimity, and the exclu-
sion of women.5 Burch indicates that further reduc-
tions in jury size and verdict composition will not
be permitted; the line has been drawn at a mini-
mum size of six persons, and a unanimous verdict
is required when the number of persons on the jury
is the minimum. Duren, on the other hand, does not
change significantly a new doctrine regarding the
sixth amendment right to ajury trial, the fair cross-
section requirement, which had just been held
applicable to women in a 1975 case.6
BuRcH v. LOUISIANA
The two defendants in Burch, Burch and Wrestle,
Inc., were convicted of exhibiting obscene motion
pictures, a nonpetty offense. A poll of the jury
following the verdict indicated that the jury had
1 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads in part: -'In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed
a Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The sixth
amendment right of trial by jury is applicable to the
states by incorporation through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
4 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
s See generally Thayer, The jug and Its Developments, 5
HARV. L. REV. 295 (1892).
6 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
voted unanimously to convict Wrestle, Inc. 7 and
had voted five-to-one to convict Burch.8 The Louis-
iana constitution contained a provision authorizing
conviction in this type of case by "a jury of six
persons, five of whom must concur to render a
verdict." 9 In affirming the defendants' convictions,
the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that none of
the United States Supreme Court's previous deci-
sions precluded convictions by nonunanimous six-
person juries and, therefore, such a conviction did
not offend the United States Constitution. ° The
799 S. Ct. at 1625. The Court held that because a
unanimous jury convicted Wrestle, Inc., it lacked stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the Louisiana
law allowing conviction by a nonunanimous jury.
8 Burch received a sentence of two consecutive seven-
month prison terms, which were suspended, and was
fined S 1,000. 99 S. Ct. at 1625.
9 Article I, § 17 of the Louisiana Constitution pro-
vides:
"A criminal case in which the punishment
may be capital shall be tried before a jury of
twelve persons, all of whom must concur to
render a verdict. A case in which the punish-
ment is necessarily confinement at hard labor
shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons,
ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.
A case in which the punishment may be con-
finement at hard labor or confinement without
hard labor for more than six months shall be
tried before ajury of six persons, five of whom
must concur to render a verdict. The accused
shall have the right to full voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors and to challenge
jurors peremptorily. The number of challenges
shall be fixed by law. Except in capital cases,
a defendant may knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to a trial by jury."
Id. at 1624 n.I (quoting LA. CoNsr. art. I, § 17).
'o 360 So. 2d 831, 838 (La. 1978). The Louisiana court
noted that since State v. Wrestle, Inc., 75 percent con-
currence was enough for a verdict in Johnson v. Louis-
iana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), then 83 percent concurrence
ought to be within the Johnson limits. Id. (citing Hargrave,
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 56 n.300 (1974)). In addition the court
stated that a six-person jury was of sufficient size to
promote adequate group deliberation, to protect mem-
bers from outside intimidation, and to provide a repre-
sentative cross section of the community, as required by
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), regardless of
whether the verdict was five-to-one. 360 So. 2d at 838.
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court, thus, decided to "indulg[e] in the presump-
tion of federal constitutionality which must be
afforded to provisions of our state constitu-
tion .... 11
On review, the United States Supreme Court
did not dispute this reasoning of the Louisiana
court-even though it overturned the conviction.
The opinion by Justice Rehnquist stated that "this
case lies at the intersection of ... [its] decisions
concerning jury size and unanimity."' 2 Hence, the
Court reviewed its previous decisions on jury size
and unanimity in order to reach its own conclusion
as to the appropriate outcome.
The initial jury trial decision considered by the
Court was Duncan v. Louisiana13 which applied the
sixth amendment to the states. Two Terms later in
Williams v. Florida,4 the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether or not twelve-person juries were
constitutionally required. In its opinion the Court
delineated the history of the right to a jury trial
and concluded that the twelve-person requirement
was a historical accident which was not frozen into
the Constitution by its framers. 15 In reaching this
conclusion, the Williams Court relied on empirical
data but admitted that there were only a few
studies available, mostly in the civil area.' 6
Because the Court reversed a long line of cases
requiring a twelve-person jury and because it had
relied heavily upon a small amount of empirical
data, Justice Harlan in his dissent' 7 could not
understand how the Court had reached its decision.
Justice Harlan strongly urged that the term "jury"
should be interpreted in light of the common law,
the principles and history of which were known to
the framers of the Constitution.' 8 Justice Harlan
also felt it was obvious that a jury of twelve pro-
vided a greater safeguard against the prosecutor
and the judge which was the purpose of the jury
trial.'9
According to the Williams Court, the essential
purposes of the jury were, first, interposition of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen be-
tween the defendant and the judge and prosecutor.
Second, the purpose of the jury was to provide
community participation and shared responsibility
"1360 So. 2d at 838.
1299 S. Ct. at 1627.
'a 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
14399 U.S. 78 (1970).
'
5 Id. at 89-90, 100.
'
6 Id. at 101.
17 Id. at 117 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'old. at 117, 124.
'
9Id. at 126.
resulting from the group's determination of guilt
or innocence.20 The Court then held that these
purposes would be fulfilled by a jury of sufficient
size to promote adequate group deliberation, to
protect members from outside intimidation, and to
provide a representative cross section of the com-
munity.21 The Williams Court held that a jury of
six persons sufficiently satisfied these purposes and,
therefore, did not violate a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.
Following the Williams approach in a 1972
case,s2 the Court again inquired into the purpose
of the jury through a historical analysis of that
institution. A plurality in Apodaca v. Oregon,23 held
that the common-law-jury requirement of a unani-
mous verdict was not constitutionally required and
therefore the ten-to-two conviction in Apodaca was
affirmed.2' The plurality felt that the essential
purpose of the jury still was served despite the
absence of a unanimity requirement, because even
though a unanimity requirement would produce
hung juries in some situations where nonunani-
mous juries would convict or acquit, the interest of
the defendant in having the judgment of his peers
interposed between himself and the prosecutor and
judge was served equally as well.25
After the Williams and Apodaca decisions, the
Court became unwilling to legitimize other state
variations of the constitutional requirements of a
jury trial.26 The Court had already held that the
sixth amendment required neither a twelve-person
jury nor conviction by a unanimous vote. In doing
so, the Court had consistently protected what it
perceived to be the general purpose and essential
functioning of the jury.2 7 After these cases were
decided, many commentators analyzed the reason-
ing behind the Court's relaxation of jury require-
ments and attempted to determine the empirical
relationship between the changes in the jury and
the quality of the verdicts they render.s2
20 399 U.S. at 100.
21 id.
2 2Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality
opinion). Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stew-
art vigorously dissented stating that unanimity of the
jury was a constitutional requirement. Id. at 414-15
(Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart, JJ., dissent-
ing).
2'406 U.S. at 404.
24 Id. at 413-14.
25Id. at 410-11.
6 See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
2 7 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 410-12; Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 100.
28 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 231 n.10, for a list
of these scholarly studies.
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In Ballew v. Georgia,29 the Court was faced with
still another state modification of the composition
of the jury. The Ballew Court studied the empirical
research to determine the actual effects of the
changes it had permitted in Williams and Apodaca
and to decide whether further changes might be
detrimental to a defendant's constitutional right to
trial by jury.3° The Ballew Court acknowledged
that the collection of data does "not draw or
identify a bright line below which the number of
jurors would not be able to function as required by
the standards enunciated in Williams. On the other
hand, they raise significant questions about the
wisdom and constitutionality of a reduction below
six.3 ' 1 Hence, the Court agreed that there was a
positive correlation between group size and the
quality of both group performance in arriving at a
fair and accurate decision and group productivity
in producing accurate findings of fact and correctly
applying the commonsense of the community to
those facts.
3 2
The Court in Ballew cited a number of studies
which explained the specific effects on group per-
formance and productivity when the size of the
group was reduced.3 3 For example, "[t]he smaller
the group, the less likely are members to make
critical contributions necessary for the solution of
a given problem." Also, "[b]ecause most juries
are not permitted to take notes, ... memory is
important for accurate jury deliberations."3 The
smaller the number of jurors, the less likely it is
that there will be members of the jury who remem-
ber each of the important pieces of evidence or
argument.3 6 Moreover, "[t]he smaller the group,
the less likely it is to overcome the biases of its
members to obtain an accurate result., 37 Particu-
larly critical, the Court noted, is the jury's function
of "counter-balancing" various biases in bringing
to bear the commonsense of the community to the
facts of any given case.38 Almost every study cited
in the Ballew opinion indicated that six-person
juries do not perform as well in these capacities as
twelve-person juries.-* Therefore, even though the
29435 U.S. 223 (1978).
38 Id. at 231-32.
31 id.
32 Id. at 232-33.
3id.




" Id. at 234.
9 Id. at 233; see Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size,
60 Psyc". BULL. 371, 373 (1963).
Court still held to the view that the Constitution
did not command twelve-person juries, it felt that
any further reduction below six persons, even if the
verdict was unanimous, would impair a defend-
ant's right to trial by jury.
These same doubts regarding the functioning of
a six-person jury, instigated by the empirical stud-
ies, led the Court to conclude in Burch that when
a six-person jury is used, unanimity of verdict must
be required despite the holding in Apodaca that
unanimity is not required when a twelve-person
jury is utilized.40 The Court supported this decision
with the fact that of all the states that use six-
person juries in trials of nonpetty offenses, only
two, Louisiana and Oklahoma, permit a nonunan-
imous verdict.41 Moreover, the Court found that
alleged state benefits through reduction in time
and expense of administering its system of criminal
justice through the use of nonunanimous six-person
juries was "speculative at best",4 2 and an insuffi-
cient justification for their use.43 Hence, all of the
Justices agreed that the six-person jury must be
unanimous.44
ANALYSIS OF BURCH
Since the Court first applied the constitutional
right to trial by jury to the states in Duncan, it has
endeavored to elucidate what this right involves.
The Duncan Court explained that the purpose of a
jury trial is to provide, "an accused with the right
to be tried by a jury of his peers, [giving] ... him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge. 45
The Williams Court explained that this purpose
of the jury is attained by the participation of the
community in determinations of guilt by the ap-
plication of the commonsense of laymen who, as
jurors, consider the case.46 The Williams Court
concluded that the sixth amendment mandated a
jury only of sufficient size to promote group delib-
4o Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
41 Id. at 1628 n.12.
42 Id. at 1628.
43 id.
"Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall concurred
for the same reasons that they felt a twelve-person jury
must be unanimous. It follows logically that they would
conclude that a six-person jury must be unanimous. But
they would not have remanded the case for retrial as they
believed that the obscenity statute under which the de-
fendants were convicted was overbroad and therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at 1629 (Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156.
46 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 100.
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eration, to insulate members from outside intimi-
dation, and to provide a representative cross section
of the community.
4 7
The major significance of Burch, therefore, is that
the Court has now determined that it must draw
the line somewhere regarding the size of the group
convicting an accused to preserve the substance of
the jury trial right.48 Although the Court cited no
empirical data concerning the 'importance of una-
nimity, it recognized that reductions in the size of
the common-law jury have gone far enough and
that a requirement of unanimity for a six-person
jury prevents an imperfect jury system from becom-
ing more unrepresentative, unfair, and inaccurate.
Judging from the results of the empirical studies
published since the Williams decision, it appears
that the result in Burch was the only one possible.
The Court has repeated a number of times that the
essential purpose of the jury is its interposition of
the commonsense judgment of the community be-
tween the accused and his accusers.49 But in Apodaca
the plurality held that unanimity did "not mate-
rially contribute to the exercise of this common-
sense judgment. ' ' 5° However, six years after Apo-
daca, the Court in Ballew decided that effective and
accurate jury deliberation was an important ele-
ment of the right to a jury trial.51 If a jury is
allowed to reach a verdict with only five members
agreeing, it seems clear that there needs to be less
deliberation than if all six members had to agree.
It follows logically from Ballew, where the Court
held that agreement by a five-member jury did not
afford a defendant his constitutional right to ajury
trial,52 that agreement by five members of a six-
person jury would not afford a defendant his con-
stitutional right to ajury trial.
DUREN V. MISSOURI
In Duren,s the defendant alleged that his sixth
amendment right to trial by jury had been in-
fringed because the jury selection process in Jack-
son County systematically excluded women and,
therefore, the venires were not made up of a fair
cross section of the community.5 The decision in
47 Id.
4' Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. at 1627.
49See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 229; Apodaca v
Oregon, 406 U.S. at 410; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
at 100; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156.50Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 411.
"' See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 232-34.
52 Id. at 245.
3439 U.S. 357 (1979).
r Id. at 360. The jury selection process began with an
Duren was not surprising since the Missouri statute
exempting women from jury service was similar to
the Louisiana statute declared unconstitutional in
a 1975 case.Ss Additionally, the statistical facts
presented by the defendant in Duren, when com-
pared to the statistics in the previous case, evi-
denced similar under representation of women on
jury venires, even though the percentage of women
on the jury venires in Duren was greater than the '
percentage of women in the venires in the previous
case.
56
The defendant in Duren established that 54 per-
cent of the adult inhabitants of Jackson County
were women.
5 7
He also [established] ... that for the periods June-
October 1975 andJanuary-March 1976, 11,197 per-
sons were summoned, and 2,992 of these or 26.7%,
were women. Of those summoned, 741 women and
4,378 men appeared for service. Thus, 14.5% (741
out of 5,119) of the persons on the postsummons
weekly venires during the period in which the de-
fendant's jury was chosen were female.s5
The defendant alleged that this underrepresenta-
tion of women was caused by the automatic stat-
utory exemption from jury service.59
Even though the Missouri Supreme Court ques-
tioned the defendant's statistical presentation,60 it
annual mailing of a questionnaire to approximately
70,000 persons randomly selected from voter registration
lists. The questionnaire contained a list of occupations
and additional categories which were the basis for either
disqualification or exemption from jury service under
Missouri law. There was also a paragraph to women
informing them that if they chose not to serve they should
fill out and return the questionnaire.
Next, all of the names of those who received question-
naires, excluding those returned questionnaires which
indicated a disqualification or exemption, were placed in
the jury wheel. Then summonses were mailed weekly to
prospective jurors drawn randomly from the jury wheel.
The summons had a paragraph similar to that of the
questionnaire advising women who wished to claim the
exemption to return the summons. Under Missouri law,
women could claim an exemption at any time before
being sworn as a juror.
" Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). One com-
mentator predicted the Missouri statute's ultimate un-
constitutionality. See Comment, The Female Exemption from
Jury Service in Missouri, 43 U. Mo. KANSAS CtTV L. REv.
382 3Q (1q75.
' Compare Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.b. at 3o'-63, with
Tailor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 524.
s7 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 362.
w Id. at 362 (footnotes omitted).9 Id. at 360.
60 State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 1977),
rev'd, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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held, assuming arguendo that his statistics were
valid, that the number of females in the jury wheel
and those appearing were well above the constitu-
tional standards established in Taylor v. Louisiana.6 '
However, the United States Supreme Court in
Duren stated that it granted certiorari because of its
concern that the decision of the Missouri Supreme
Court was, in fact, inconsistent with its decision in
Taylor.
62
In Taylor the Court nad summarized the devel-
opment of the sixth amendment fair cross-section
requirement. 63 "[J]ury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups
in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof."6' Concluding that even
though women were not allowed to serve as jurors
when the Constitution was written, the Court de-
cided that women were a distinctive group in the
community and, therefore, it was "no longer tena-
ble to hold that women as a class may be excluded
or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex




After Taylor several questions remained unan-
swered. The Missouri Supreme Court, for example,
concentrated upon the words of the Court that the
constitutional defect in Taylor was that the criminal
"jury venires are almost totally male."' Since the
Missouri wheel contained between 29 to 30 percent
women whereas the wheels in Taylor contained only
10 percent women, the Missouri court concluded
that its jury composition was well above acceptable
constitutional standards.' 7 Indeed, Taylor left un-
clear exactly what percentages a defendant would
have to prove to establish underrepresentation on
jury venires so as to establish a violation of the fair
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.
The Court in Duren attempted to clarify these
ambiguities. First, Justice White's opinion for the
'556 S.W. 2d at 16-17.62 439 U.S. at 363.
3 The early cases first discussing what is now termed
the fair cross-section requirement spoke in terms ofjuries
which were representative of the community. Most of
these cases involved the exclusion of racial groups. See
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 526-30; Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
' Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538.
6Id. at 537.
66 Id. (emphasis added).6
7 State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d at 15-17.
Court set up a tripartite test to establish a prima
facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement.
To establish a prima facie violation, the defendant
must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "dis-
tinctive" group in the community; (2) that the rep-
resentation of this group in venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.'
The Court, however, did not explain what it
meant by "distinctive." This question has already
produced confusion in the lower courts. In the year
since the Duren decision was handed down, some
lower courts have struggled with the word "dis-
tinctive" and have resorted to other lower court
cases for definitions of "distinctive" or "cogniza-
ble.'" One lower court has interpreted "distinc-
tive" to mean a group larger than many of the
small minorities in the population.
70
Similarly, the Court did not explicitly explain
part two of the prima facie test. It is still not clear
what representation by the "distinctive" group will
be considered fair and reasonable. However, it is
now clear that the way to establish this second
element of the prima facie test is through a statis-
tical presentation comparing the percentage of the
group in the community to the percentage of the
group on jury venires.7 '
Just as with the first two, the Court did not
explain part three of the prima facie test. But,
Duren suggests that if a defendant can prove that
the underrepresentation of the group occurred in
every weekly venire for a significant period of time,
then he or she will probably have established sys-
tematic exclusion.
72
After the Court listed the prima facie test, it
proceeded to analyze the Duren facts in light of the
tripartite test. In each part of its analysis the Court
in Duren relied on Taylor for support. Regarding the
distinctive nature of the group excluded, the Court
stated explicitly that "Taylor without doubt estab-
' 8 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 364.
69See United States v. Goodlow, 597 F.2d 159, 162
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hanson, 472 F. Supp.
1049 (D. Minn. 1979).
70 United States v. Hanson, 472 F. Supp. at 1053. The
court questioned whether Indians, which constituted 1.8
percent of the population were a "distinctive" group
under Duren. The court concluded that they were not.




lished that women 'are sufficiently numerous and
distinct from men' such that 'if they are systemat-
ically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth
Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement can-
not be satisfied." '7
The Court then held that the defendant had
satisfied the second prong of the prima facie test of
demonstrating unfair representation of the group
on juries by his statistical presentation. 74 The Court
simply stated that such a gross discrepancy between
the actual percentage of women in the community
(54 percent) and the percentage of women on jury
venires (15 percent) required the conclusion that
women are not fairly represented in the venires,
the source from which petit juries were drawn in
Jackson County.75 As Justice Rehnquist noted in
dissent, however, it is still not clear from the Court's
opinion what percentages of representation on jury
venires will be acceptable in the future to satisfy
the fair cross-section requirement.76
The defendant also established that the same
large discrepancy occurred in every weekly venire.
This led the Court to conclude that the underrep-
resentation of women was systematic, and that it
was inherent in the particularjury selection process
utilized. The defendant, therefore, had established
the third and final. part of his prima facie case.
77
In the last section of his opinion, Justice White
explained that Taylor permits the state to rebut the
defendant's prima facie case if it is able to prove a
significant interest in the jury-selection process
which results in the disproportionate exclusion of
a distinctive group.78 However, Justice White
pointed out that the state interest in safeguarding
the important role of women in the home and
family life was an insufficient justification for the
disproportionate exclusion of women from jury
venires. 7
Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing
of an infringement of his constitutional right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the com-
munity and the state has satisfied its burden of
7 ld at 364 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at
531).
14 439 U.S. at 365-66.
7sld
76 Id. at 374 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 439 U.S. at 366-67.
' Id. at 367-68, This interest must be more than
simply rational.
I'ld. at 369. Justice White mentioned certain state
interests which could justify exemptions from jury service.
One such interest was to insure that those members of
the family responsible for the care of children are per-
mitted to remain at home, regardless of whether they are
male or female. Id.
showing that the attainment of a fair cross section
was incompatible with a significant state interest,
the state must then further demonstrate that those
exemptions which would justify failure to achieve
a fair cross section caused the underrepresentation
complained of.s°
Justice White reiterated what the Court had said
in Taylor about exemptions from jury service which
would be constitutionally permissible: "[I]t is un-
likely that reasonable exemptions, such as those
based on special hardship, incapacity, or commu-
nity needs, 'would pose substantial threats that the
remaining pool of jurors would not be representa-
tive of the community.' 8 ' This should allay fears
about the "slippery slope" effect that the Duren
decision may have. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
postulated that the Duren decision will cause states
to abandon occupational-based classifications for
the purposes of jury service. He predicted that
doctors and nurses will be forced to serve on juries
in the future even though they may be irreplacea-
ble in the community.8
In his dissent Justice Rehnquist further opined
that the Court was really concerned with the "dis-
tinctive" group's right to serve on a jury rather
than the defendant's right to a jury selected from
a fair cross section of the communityss He at-
tempted to substantiate this statement by the fact
that Taylor relied on equal protection cases and
that the analysis the Court used in Taylor and Duren
sounds like an equal protection analysis.8
4
Indeed, Justice White noted that the only dis-
tinction between the Court's sixth amendment fair
cross-section analysis and its equal protection cases
is that there is no need to prove discriminatory
purpose under a sixth amendment challenge.s' It
follows that the proof is much easier here than in
an equal protection challenge.
The Court could have responded more directly
to justice Rehnquist's dissent. It is possible that the
Court was truly concerned with a defendant's right
to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community. In analyzing this type of challenge the
Court appears to have borrowed from its equal
protection analysis omitting the need to prove
discriminatory purpose. The Court may have seen
this as a way of giving additional protection to a
s Id.
81 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 370 (quoting Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 534).
82 439 U.S. at 377 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
ss Id. at 371 n.*.
I41d. at 371.
439 U.S. at 368 n.26.
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criminal defendant challenging a jury selection
process under the sixth amendment in the form of
an easier burden of proof.
ANALYSIS OF DUREN
In addition to the Court's failure to sufficiently
answer the equal protection-sixth amendment
confusion pointed out by Justice Rehnquist, there
were a number of questions left open by the Duren
decision.
First, one question regarding the consistency of
the Court's decision was raised by Justice Rehn-
quist. As noted in his dissent, if the purpose of a
jury is the interposition of the commonsense judg-
ment of a group of layman between the accused
and his accuser, it accomplishes nothing to require
a fair cross section on the venires and then not
require the jury itself to be made up of a fair cross
section of the community.8
Indeed, the Court has indicated in one case that
it believes the achievement of an impartial verdict
requires that the jury represent a fair cross section
of community attitudes toward capital punish-
ment.8 7 The state, in that case, was not allowed to
challenge for cause all prospective jurors who were
opposed to capital punishment. The Court held
that a defendant's sixth amendment right to trial
by jury prohibited the exclusion of an entire group
with certain ideas from the jury.88 Following this
reasoning, the focus of Duren should have been on
the percentage of women on the jury panel. How-
ever, the Court has never found a sixth amendment
right to a panel representing a fair cross section of
the community
The Court in Duren pointed out that tnere are
some exemptions to jury representation which are
constitutionally permissible.89 Another question re-
mains, however, whether any exemptions can be
justified in light of a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a jury venire selected from a fair cross
section of the community. The reasons behind
these exemptions must therefore be balanced
against the benefits accruing to a defendant from
the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth
amendment.
MId. at 37 In.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
88 Id. at 529
°" The Court stated that an exemption for th, e mem-
bers of the family responsible for the care of chidren
would probably be constitutional. Also mentioned by the
Court were exemptions based on special hardship, inca-
pacity, or community needs. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
at 370.
Doctors and nurses are commonly exempted
from jury service because the jobs they perform are
more important to society than the benefit of hav-
ing them serve on juries. One argument against
exempting doctors and nurses is that they bring an
important unique perspective to the jury. On the
other hand, in a community which does not have
an adequate supply of doctors and nurses, it may
be more beneficial to society as a whole to allow
them exemptions from jury service. However, per-
haps this benefit to society can be accomplished in
another way which would not totally exempt doc-
tors and nurses. This alternative solution would
entail individual exemptions depending on the
particular fact situation. For example, if a doctor
practices in a small community where his absence
in order to serve on a jury would probably be
detrimental to the community's health care, this
doctor should be exempt from jury service. The
argument against this type of case by case exemp-
tion process is that the cost to the state may be
high. But, if total exemption of these groups causes
jury panels to be unrepresentative of the commu-
nity, then a cost argument does not appear to be a
significant enough state interest to justify group
exemptions.
The Duren Court opined further that states may
provide reasonable exemptions as long as the jury
lists or panels are fairly representative of the com-
munity. This statement is internally contradictory.
If an entire group is exempted from jury duty then
obviously the jury panels will be less representative.
In addition the more groups that are exempted,
the less representative the jury panels become.
Hence, it appears difficult to justify total exemp-
tions for any group.
CONCLUSION
Both sixth amendment jury cases decided last
Term indicate that the Court is willing to give
more expanded rights to a defendant faced with a
jury trial. In Burch the Court emphasized that the
cutting away from the common law requirements
of a jury-twelve persons and unanimity-has
come to a conclusion and that the Court may be
heading toward a rebuilding of the jury; however,
it is doubtful that we will see a twelve-person
unanimous jury requirement in the forseeable fu-
ture. Burch does leave some questions unanswered
such as whether or not juries composed of less than
twelve but more than six persons require unani-
mous verdicts. However, Burch is helpful because it
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draws the line at the minimum constitutional re-
quirements for jury size and verdict based on the
proper purposes and the essential functioning of
the jury in our constitutional system.
Duren, on the other hand, seems to contribute
little to the Taylor fair cross-section requirement for
jury venires. Although Duren does set out the prima
facie test explicitly, it still leaves a number of
questions unanswered. It is unclear what groups
will be considered "distinctive" in the future so as
to invoke a constitutional violation if the group is
systematically excluded from jury venires. It is also
uncertain whether the Court will eventually apply
the fair cross-section requirement to the juries
themselves and not just the venires from which
they are chosen. The sixth amendment right to a
jury trial is still a developing area which needs
additional analysis by the Court.
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